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Abstract: The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) provided overwhelming evidence of the problems caused 
by inadequate credit ratings. Losses and problem loans experienced by banks over this period were 
staggering. Yet many of the securitized sub-prime parcels which were widely seen as an underlying cause of 
the GFC, as well as corporate obligors who experienced severe difficulties during the GFC, retained 
extremely strong external credit ratings. They may have had low perceived risk at the time of rating, but as 
circumstances changed, the ratings stayed static and became far removed from the underlying risk. A key 
problem is that the external credit ratings do not fluctuate with changing economic circumstances. Whilst 
there are models which measure changing default risk, they are not linked to credit ratings and it is often the 
rating itself, not the underlying risk that drives behavior, such as the purchase of securitized parcels, the 
pricing of credit risk, and the allocation of capital for credit risk, which under the Basel standardized model 
for corporates is based on the rating itself. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that these ratings carry 
descriptors such as “extremely strong capacity”. This descriptor may no longer be appropriate for the rated 
company if the market turns dramatically, yet the rating and descriptor remain unchanged.  
To overcome this problem, this paper shows how an innovative fluctuating credit ratings model can be 
generated by linking the Merton structural credit model to a credit ratings framework. The Merton model 
measures fluctuations in daily asset values and, using a combination of these fluctuating asset values and the 
capital structure of a company, it measures Distance to Default (DD) and the Probability of Default (PD) 
associated with each DD. Under the Merton structural model, default occurs when the firm’s debt exceeds 
asset values. Thus as fluctuations in asset values become more volatile, DD also becomes more volatile and 
PD increases. External raters such as Moody’s provide PD’s associated with each rating. Thus by using the 
Merton model, we are able to generate PDs which fluctuate over time and link these PD’s to credit ratings. 
Therefore, as our PD’s fluctuate, so do the credit ratings. 
To illustrate our approach, we apply this model to a French motor vehicle company (Renault) which 
experienced severe distress during the GFC.  We compare the Moody’s rating changes that took place for 
Renault over the 2006 – 2009 period, which captures the events leading up to and during the GFC. Over this 
period, only three Moody’s external ratings changes took place and throughout this period, Renault stayed in 
the Moody’s ‘moderate’ risk band. Based on this, an investor would likely assume the company was in 
reasonable financial health, and a bank would not be required to change its capital allocation for this 
company if it was a borrower. Yet during this period, the company experienced such severe financial 
problems that it had to be bailed out by the French Government. Our model, on the other hand, recognizes 
these stresses far quicker, starting with rating downgrades for Renault from August 2007 and moving 
downwards through several risk bands, from ‘moderate’ to ‘substantial’ to ‘high’ and then to ‘very high’ 
credit risk. This downward spiral is far more in keeping with the actual problems experienced by Renault 
than the static ‘moderate’ risk tag would indicate.  We thus find that the new model responds extremely 
rapidly to changing economic circumstances to produce ratings which can far more accurately depict the 
underlying credit risk of a corporate obligor in these times than prevailing external rating methods.  
The new ratings can benefit bond investors and banks through improved knowledge of the underlying credit 
risk of bonds and of corporate borrowers. As capital adequacy can also be linked to credit ratings, an 
improved rating model can assist banks and regulators to better measure required capital adequacy to protect 
against economic downturns. 
 
Keywords: Credit risk, Credit ratings, Fluctuating default risk 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
During the GFC external credit rating agencies were severely criticized for having provided credit ratings 
which did not reflect the inherent risk of the underlying asset or entity. Over the two years to 2009, impaired 
assets (problem loans) in the US trebled from 2.4% of total assets to 8.8%, an increase of USD 480 billion. 
UK bank impaired assets increased from 2.1% to 6.6% over this period, an increase of USD 576 billion. The 
5 largest US banks lost nearly USD 50 billion in 2008, and the 5 largest banks in the UK lost approximately 
£20 billion (Reserve Bank of Australia, 2009a). More than 400 US banks failed in 2009 compared to 25 in 
2008, 3 in 2007 and none in the prior two years. Australian banks, although faring better with no bank 
failures, nonetheless had a fivefold escalation in impaired assets (although off a smaller base than the US and 
UK) from 0.2% to 1.0% (Reserve Bank of Australia, 2009b). Globally, governments had to provide hundreds 
of billions of dollars to support banks. Examples include the 2008 US $700bn Troubled Asset Relief (TARP) 
Programme and the 2008 UK £500bn financial support package. Many countries, including Australia, had to 
introduce (or increase) government deposit guarantees to shore up confidence in banks.  
Yet the enormity of these problems was never reflected in credit ratings! 
Indeed, many securitized sub-prime parcels, which are widely seen as an underlying cause of the GFC (see 
for example Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, & Vig, 2010) were rated AAA. They may have had low perceived risk 
at the time of rating, based on historically low bad debt experience of home loans, but as circumstances 
changed (falling house prices and increasing interest rates), the ratings stayed static and became far removed 
from the underlying risk.  Many banks that were struggling retained static ratings right throughout most or all 
of the GFC. As the problems spread to the corporate obligors, and bank bad debts escalated enormously, 
credit ratings for these obligors generally stayed static until long after the problems had passed. The problem 
is that credit ratings are undertaken only periodically (often annually or even with several years in between 
ratings) and do not reflect changes in circumstances in the intervening period.  According to Moody’s 
(2013b) “our ratings are not intended to ratchet up and down” with changing economic conditions, rather 
ratings are designed to be measures of relative risk. While this may be fine when comparing the relative risk 
of one loan or bond to another, it becomes a problem when using ratings for purposes such as: a bank 
allocating capital under the Basel II (and Basel III) standardised credit risk model (Bank for International 
Settlements, 2004, 2011),  which is based on external ratings; or to provide a loan to a rated customer; or to 
allocate lending approval limits to loan officers based on ratings; or for an investor to understand the risk of a 
bond based on static ratings in dynamic circumstances. All of these require an appropriate current rating, 
rather than a relative rating set some time back. The descriptor allocated to a rating, such as “moderate risk” 
may no longer be appropriate for the company if the market turns dramatically, yet the rating and descriptor 
remain unchanged. The example in the following table shows the probability of default (PD) that Moody’s 
(2010) allocated to rankings Baa1 and Ba3 across the height of the GFC.  
Table 1. Moody’s PD rankings associated with selected ratings (%) 
Ba3 PD Caa2 PD 
2006 0.484% 6.742% 
2007 0.000% 8.222% 
2008 2.715% 18.812% 
2009 4.010% 39.298% 
 
Table 1 shows that an obligor could have a massive PD increase from 2006 - 2009, yet retain the same 
ranking, descriptor, and capital allocation. The above discussion shows the highly significant problems that 
can occur due to inappropriate ratings, including poor investment and loan decisions, inadequate bank 
capital, and severe bank stresses which all have major implications for financial stability. Thus there is a 
strong need to revisit current static credit rating methods. Research which leads to credit ratings systems that 
more accurately measure ratings, respond quickly to dynamic economic circumstances and improve capital 
adequacy decisions for banks, would make a highly significant contribution to the field of credit risk 
measurement. That is exactly the purpose of this paper. The aim of the study is to develop credit ratings 
which accurately reflect prevailing circumstances and which respond rapidly as these circumstances change. 
The dynamic credit ratings framework proposed in this research is an entirely original and innovative concept 
which could potentially change the face of future credit rating systems, leading to significant improvements 
in the understanding and measurement of credit risk.  
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To illustrate our methodology, we use the example of Renault, a French motor vehicle company which 
experienced severe stress during the GFC and required French Government bailout. It should be noted that 
this study is by no means intended as a comprehensive analysis, but rather as an exploratory paper which 
outlines a potential framework for generating dynamic ratings, and which is to be further explored and 
developed in future studies which can test the robustness of this proposed ratings framework in a wide range 
of markets and scenarios. Section 2 of this paper discusses our methodology. To put our example in context, 
Section 3 provides a brief background on Renault and the circumstances under which the motor vehicle 
industry was operating over the GFC. Section 4 presents and discusses results and Section 5 concludes.  
2.   METHODOLOGY 
The previous section discussed the highly static or ‘sluggish’ nature of credit ratings and how they do not 
‘ratchet’ up or down with changing economic circumstances, which is a key disadvantage of current rating 
models. At the time of the rating taking place, there is a thorough and detailed assessment of the risk of the 
firm by the external rater (including factors such as financial accounts, the industry and the firm 
management). The problem is that this assessment may no longer be valid as circumstances change. This 
research intends to link market based measurements of asset quality to credit ratings to produce ‘ratcheting 
ratings’ which do fluctuate in tandem with economic circumstances.  
We use the Merton (1974) structural model as modified by Moody’s KMV (Crosbie & Bohn, 2003) hereafter 
referred to as the Merton/KMV model. Merton/KMV holds that the determinants of default are: asset values 
of a firm, fluctuations in those asset values, and the leverage. These items are used to calculate Distance to 
Default (DD) and Probability of Default (PD). The firm defaults when debt exceeds market asset values. A 
significant advantage that this model has over other credit models is that it responds rapidly to changing 
market conditions, as share price values are a core component of fluctuating asset values. These fluctuating 
asset values can be measured frequently, even daily, whereas models based on credit ratings are much slower 
to respond. The Merton/KMV model has been shown to have a much higher accuracy than these other 
models in times of economic distress, as shown for example in Allen and Powell (2010). Nobel laureate 
Robert Engel (2011) finds that there is a strong link between falling equity prices and bankruptcy and uses a 
Merton style model to effectively measure systemic risk. Auvray & Brossard (2012) find that the model can 
be a good lead indicator of bank distress, due to its market component. We link the asset fluctuations 
generated by Merton KMV to credit ratings, thus creating an original, innovative and dynamic ratcheting 
rating system, allowing the rating to fluctuate with market conditions. 
Volatility in market value of assets, is measured by Merton/KMV as the standard deviation of asset returns 
(σV). We use the approaches outlined by KMV (Crosbie & Bohn, 2003) and Bharath & Shumway (2008).  
Initial asset returns (for every day) in our data set are estimated from historical daily equity data using the 








EV σσ         (1) 









       (2) 
Where V is the market value of the firm, F = face value of firm’s debt, and µ = an estimate of the annual 
return (drift) of the firm’s assets. T is the selected forecasting time period. In line with KMV, debt is taken as 
the value of all short-term liabilities (one year and under) plus half the book value of all long term debt 
outstanding. DD as measured above is the number of standard deviations away from default.  
Probability of Default (PD) can be determined using the normal distribution. For example, if DD = 2 standard 
deviations, we know there is a 95% probability that assets will vary between 1 and two standard deviations. 
There is a 2.5% probability that they will fall by more than 2 standard deviations. Using N as the cumulative 
standard normal distribution function, PD is measured as: 
)( DDNPD −=          (3) 
There are two problems with this PD calculation. First it assumes that PD’s follow a normal distribution. This 
is often not the case with credit risk which can be characterized with high losses in the tail of the distribution, 
especially in turbulent times such as was seen over the GFC. Secondly Moody’s KMV have an extensive 
database of actual losses, and find that the PD’s yielded by equation 3 are often much too small. To 
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overcome these problems, KMV calibrate the DD’s to actual experienced losses, to provide an Estimated 
Default Frequency (EDF). They also provide a cap and a floor on their EDF’s which range between 0.1% and 
35% as compared to equation 3, which can range between 0% and 50%. The EDFS also tend to be higher 
than the PDF when DD is high, for example, when DD is 4, then PD is 0.0003%, but EDF is 0.4%. Moody’s 
(2012) provide a graph of how the EDF maps to PD. Whilst we use the PD calculation in our analysis, we 
also explain how this differs from EDF.  
As we are using daily asset returns, we can estimate the DD per equation 2 at any point (day month or year) 
in the cycle. We have calculated DD on a monthly basis to show how it fluctuates. We then then calculate the 
PD associated with each DD per equation 3. Rather than allowing the PDs to shift around like Moody’s and 
S&P, we maintain a constant band of PD’s for each rating (based on Moody’s PD values at our starting point 
in 2006), and then change the rating if it falls above or below that threshold. 
3.  BACKGROUND TO OUR EXAMPLE: THE COMPANY AND THE INDUSTRY 
Renault is a French motor vehicle manufacturer established in 1899. It is Europe’s fifth largest motor vehicle 
manufacturer (behind Volkswagen, Daimler, BMW and Fiat and ahead of Peugeot/Citroen per figures 
obtained from Datastream) with sales of  €43bn in 2012 and total assets of €43bn.  
Globally, the new car market suffered severe problems during the GFC with General Motors and Chrysler 
filing for bankruptcy in 2008, and many other manufacturers, including one of the world’s largest car 
manufacturers Toyota, posting losses in 2009. This led to many manufacturers downsizing their operations. 
In Europe, Volkswagen and BMW experienced significant profit reductions in 2009, with Daimler, Fiat, 
Renault and Peugeot all experiencing losses. Along with global trends, share prices in the European car 
market plunged 70% from its peak in 2007 to its trough in 2008. Globally, including Europe, the motor 
vehicle industry was beset by downsizing, job losses and restructuring. There are some key reasons why the 
new motor vehicle industry is particularly susceptible to economic downturns. Job losses cause reductions in 
discretionary purchases. Even employed consumers often put larger purchases such as vehicles on hold 
during difficult economic times. Sales are also highly reliant on motor vehicle finance being provided to 
purchasers. This latter issue was particularly prevalent during the GFC when the credit crunch following the 
sub-prime problems made it very difficult to obtain motor vehicle finance. When automakers started 
experiencing major problems, they then it found it almost impossible to raise further finance to keep their 
companies afloat. 
In 2008, Renault experienced a 78% profit drop and in 2009, suffered losses of €3bn. Faced with difficulties 
in obtaining finance and the prospect of huge job losses and plant closures, Renault and Peugeot Citroen each 
received French Government bailout packages of €3bn. For several years prior to the GFC, Renault had 
enjoyed good profitability and stability and was rated A2 by Moody’s. The company was downgraded to 
Baa1 in December 2006, to Baa2 in September 2008 and to Baa3 in August 2009. These ratings will be 
further discussed in Section 4.  
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The results of our analysis of Renault are presented in Table 2. Column 1 shows that Moody’s re-ratings  
occurred only three times across the sample period, moving from Baa1 to Baa2 to Baa3. Column 2 shows the 
PDs associated with the Moody’s ratings as per Moody’s (2010), remembering that our example is using the 
PDs for each rating band as reported by Moody’s at our start date of 2006 as we do not allow the PDs 
associated with each band to fluctuate, rather allowing the ratings to fluctuate. Column 3 shows the DD 
calculated for each month using equation 1. The DD reduces quite dramatically over the period from a high 
of 7.59 in June 2007 to a low of 1.98 in February 2009. Allen, Kramadibrata, Powell & Singh (2013) show 
that during the GFC, Peugeot  had the lowest DD of all the European motor vehicle manufacturers. DD per 
equation 1 and equation 2, essentially comprises two key elements, being equity (assets less debt) and 
fluctuations in the market asset values. At the height of the GFC, Renault had equity of 53%, broadly in line 
with the average for the motor vehicle manufacturing industry in Europe, so Renault’s DD problems related 
more to the fluctuations in market value of assets (as opposed to equity), brought about by the problems they 
were experiencing as summarized in Section 3.  Column 4 shows the implied PD associated with each 
monthly DD, calculated using equation 3. This climbs from 0.00% to a peak of 2.41%, as opposed to the 
static 0.00% that is indicated by the Moody’s rating. Column 5 then applies the Moody’s rating that is 
associated with each PD. For example, in 2006 Moody’s PD associated with B1 was 0.78%. As PD exceeds 
that threshold in Sept 2008, Column 5 applies a B1 rating for Sept 2008. Moody’s PD for Caa1 in 2006 was 
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2.279 and the PD in Column 5 exceeds that threshold in February 2009, a Caa1 rating is applied in that 
month.   
It can be seen in the last two columns that our dynamic ratings change far sooner (and fall much further) than 
the external ratings, as our ratings respond immediately to the fluctuating market asset values captured by 
DD, in line with the problems experienced by Renault. 
We have mentioned that KMV EDF values are higher than PD values and also have a floor of 0.1%, which 
means our rating changes based on PD are conservative. An EDF distribution provided by Moody’s indicates 
that the ratings for Renault based on EDF would be approximately 1 rating lower than we have provided 
here, e.g. Ba3 where our PD indicates Ba2, but would not fall further than Caa1, which is the same riskiest 
point as indicated by our PD. 
 
Table 2. Comparing actual ratings to our dynamic ratings 
 
 
Table 2 shows that Moody’s ratings stayed at the Baa level throughout the period. Moody’s (2013a) 
description for a Baa rating is, among other wording, “moderate credit risk”. The numerical modifiers 1, 2 
and 3 do not change the description but a modifier of 1 indicates that it is at the higher end of the generic 
rating category, a modifier of 2 at the mid-rage, and a modifier of 3 at the lower end. Table 3 shows that the 
credit risk description stays the same throughout the period based on Moody’s ratings. Based on our  
dynamic ratings, it moves through a range of descriptions from moderate though substantial, through high, to 
very high. Given that Renault moved from a stable profitable company in the early 2000’s to one that 
required government bailout in 2009, it is not feasible that the credit risk descriptor should stay the same. Our 
model captures these events. From an EDF perspective, the range of rating descriptors would not differ 
substantially from those of our PD indicators below: as discussed above Table 3, they would be 
approximately 1 rating lower than those indicated by DD, which in most months for Renault will only affect 
the numerical modifier rather than the rating band and description. 
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5
Moody's Moody's Our Our Our Dynamic Rating
Date Rating PD (%) DD Implied PD (%) ( Moody's Numbering)
2009 August Baa3 0.00% 2.23 1.29% B2
July 2.21 1.35% B2
June 2.17 1.50% B2
May 2.18 1.46% B2
April 2.15 1.57% B2
March 2.03 2.09% B2
February 1.98 2.41% Caa1
January 2.03 2.12% B2
2008 December 2.08 1.89% B2
November 2.06 1.96% B2
October 2.14 1.61% B2
September Baa2 0.00% 2.37 0.89% B1
August 3.18 0.07% Ba2
July 3.14 0.08% Ba2
June 3.13 0.09% Ba2
May 3.27 0.05% Ba2
April 3.27 0.05% Ba2
March 3.31 0.05% Ba2
February 3.33 0.04% Ba2
January 3.37 0.04% Ba2
2007 December 3.58 0.02% Ba2
November 3.62 0.01% Ba2
October 3.78 0.01% Ba2
September 7.41 0.00% Baa1
August 7.38 0.00% Baa1
July 7.47 0.00% Baa1
June 7.59 0.00% Baa1
May 7.46 0.00% Baa1
April 7.35 0.00% Baa1
March 7.26 0.00% Baa1
February 7.30 0.00% Baa1
January 7.36 0.00% Baa1
2006 December Baa1 0.00% 7.30 0.00% Baa1
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Table 3. Rating Descriptions. 
 
 
Besides potentially lulling investors into a false sense of security, stable ratings and descriptors can also have 
capital implications for Banks. The Basel standardized model (Bank for International Settlements, 2004, 
2011) requires 8% of risk weighted assets to be held as capital, with corporate weightings depending on 
external ratings. Thus if the rating is inadequate, the capital is also inadequate. Conversely, a bank could be 
holding excess capital in upturns. Allen, Kramadibrata, Powell and Singh (2011), using a US  portfolio 
consisting of  a mixture of investment and speculative grade companies, showed that, under the Basel Accord 
standardised model, capital allocation was only required to increase by a fraction of one percentage point 
during  the GFC based on credit ratings, against a backdrop of  more than 300% increase in impaired assets 
and default probabilities. Banks, globally, during the GFC were beset by capital shortages with many global 
banks simply running out of capital or requiring government bailouts and recapitalisation. We have already 
shown how static ratings can be very different to our ratings. In our Renault example, a Baa rating under 
Basel requires the bank to hold 4% capital (50% of 8%), which based on Moody’s ratings would have stayed 
the same throughout the period. In contrast, our model would have increased this to 8% (100% of 8%) when 
it reached a B rating and to 12% (150% of 8%) at the Caa level. Again this is far more in line with the 
changing fortunes of Renault than a static capital allocation.   
   
Moody's Descriptor Moody's Descriptor
Date Based on Moody's rating Based on Our Implied PD
2009 August Moderate credit risk High credit risk
July Moderate credit risk High credit risk
June Moderate credit risk High credit risk
May Moderate credit risk High credit risk
April Moderate credit risk High credit risk
March Moderate credit risk High credit risk
February Moderate credit risk Very high credit risk
January Moderate credit risk High credit risk
2008 December Moderate credit risk High credit risk
November Moderate credit risk High credit risk
October Moderate credit risk High credit risk
September Moderate credit risk High credit risk
August Moderate credit risk Substantial credit risk
July Moderate credit risk Substantial credit risk
June Moderate credit risk Substantial credit risk
May Moderate credit risk Substantial credit risk
April Moderate credit risk Substantial credit risk
March Moderate credit risk Substantial credit risk
February Moderate credit risk Substantial credit risk
January Moderate credit risk Substantial credit risk
2007 December Moderate credit risk Substantial credit risk
November Moderate credit risk Substantial credit risk
October Moderate credit risk Substantial credit risk
September Moderate credit risk Moderate credit risk
August Moderate credit risk Moderate credit risk
July Moderate credit risk Moderate credit risk
June Moderate credit risk Moderate credit risk
May Moderate credit risk Moderate credit risk
April Moderate credit risk Moderate credit risk
March Moderate credit risk Moderate credit risk
February Moderate credit risk Moderate credit risk
January Moderate credit risk Moderate credit risk
2006 December Moderate credit risk Moderate credit risk
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5. CONCLUSION 
The research can address a major gap in existing knowledge. The prior deliberation has shown that while 
existing ratings models can be good at measuring risk at the time of the rating, they fail to respond to 
changing circumstances, thus providing market participants with a false perception of the underlying risk, 
and banks with inadequate capital. Our dynamic model on the other hand, does fluctuate with changing 
economic circumstances. Such a dynamic model can advance knowledge on credit ratings and capital 
adequacy in volatile economic circumstances. It can improve understanding of the underlying risk for bond 
investors and for banks regarding the credit risk of borrowers and the capital needed to counter this risk.  
As mentioned in our introduction, this paper is not meant to be a comprehensive analysis, but an exploratory 
paper which outlines a potential new framework for dynamic credit ratings. This lays the foundation for 
moving to an extensive analysis across industries and economic cycles, which will improve the knowledge of 
all market participants (banks, regulators and investors) as to how risks differ across industries and cycles. 
This can help investors to make better decisions and banks to make better lending and capital adequacy 
decisions.  
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